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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the frustration of Samuel Butler’s protagonist, Higgs,
with the strange society he encounters in Erewhon:
Was there nothing which I could say to make them feel that the
constitution of a person’s body was a thing over which he or she
had had at any rate no initial control whatever, while the mind
was a perfectly different thing, and capable of being created
anew and directed according to the pleasure of its possessor?
Could I never bring them to see that while habits of mind and
character were entirely independent of initial mental force and
early education, the body was so much a creature of parentage
and circumstances, that no punishment for ill-health should be
ever tolerated save as a protection from contagion, and that even
where punishment was inevitable it should be attended with
compassion?1

The Erewhonians had it all wrong, backward actually: they would
criminally prosecute someone for the physical illnesses manifested,
such as consumption, but would never prosecute those who made
bad, immoral choices.2 And it would not matter that your ill-health
was the product of a genetic weakness or malformation:
It is all very well for you to say that you came of unhealthy
parents, and had a severe accident in your childhood which permanently undermined your constitution; excuses such as these
are the ordinary refuge of the criminal; but they cannot for one
moment be listened to by the ear of justice. I am not here to enter upon curious metaphysical questions as to the origin of this
or that—questions to which there would be no end were their
introduction once tolerated, and which would result in throwing
the only guilt on the tissues of the primordial cell, or on the
elementary gases.3

1. SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON: OR OVER THE RANGE 142-43 (1917).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 113.
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Are the Erewhonians wrong? Are we? Or are we both wrong to
imagine “fault” in the case of mechanical entities, like human
agents? Higgs was certain that the Erewhonians failed to understand the nature of human agency,4 and we are compelled to wonder
if they are right and it is we who are wrong.
That is the challenge to which contemporary neuroscientific insights expose accepted normative systems, similar to our legal
system (and even our moral responsibility system). We think the
Erewhonians were wrong to impose criminal responsibility on those
who were the victims of illness.5 The consumptive is not at fault in
any way that could make sense if our object is to reduce the
suffering illness causes. Indeed, criminalizing disease would actually exacerbate the problems illness presents.6 The costs incurred by
doing so would increase the burden that illness imposes on society
and would undermine human thriving.7 But we are also sure that
contemporary legal and moral systems are just as wrong as the
Erewhonian system. Extant legal doctrine and practices (civil as
well as criminal) actually undermine human thriving: they are not
merely a distraction; they are an impediment.
Our normative systems conceive of law and morality as the
Erewhonians understood physical disease—a product of sufficient
choice to attach blame, fault, and concepts of desert.8 But on what
basis do we draw the distinctions between physical and normative
malady: Are not both just (generally) distinguishable manifestations
of mechanical causes? If human agents are essentially mechanical
entities, on what basis could we find a normative difference between, say, tuberculosis and selfishness or insufficient ability to feel
compassion for others? In fact, if you are actually indifferent to the

4. Id. at 142-43.
5. See id. at 113.
6. See Leslie Pickering Francis & John G. Francis, Criminalizing Health-Related
Behaviors Dangerous to Others? Disease Transmission, Transmission-Facilitation, and the
Importance of Trust, 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 47, 53-54, 57-61 (2012) (laws criminalizing AIDS
misguided from public health standpoint).
7. See id.
8. See PETER A. ALCES, THE MORAL CONFLICT OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 21-23 (2018).
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suffering of others, a typical psychopath,9 what could be the
nonphysical cause of that indifference?
Butler was prescient, and his Erewhon demonstrates an understanding of human agency that is precocious, anticipating what
would only be revealed at the dawn of the Age of Realization: “Man,
he said, was a machinate mammal.”10 All we are is mechanism, and
that conclusion is not undermined in the least by the fact that we do
not yet understand all that there is to understand about the mechanism.11 While it may not be possible for us to predict the next
instant even were we to know all there is to know about the past
and current instants, that does not undermine a mechanical conception of human agency, or of the universe for that matter.12 It is
enough that we understand that mechanics capture well enough
what we are at the level that matters to human thriving and the
law, so we do not even need to know very much about quantum
mechanics (though we need to know some relativity to understand
GPS).13 At the level of acuity the law requires, it is enough that we
appreciate the mechanical nature of human agency, for that is the
level at which we can appreciate the immorality of basing normative
systems, such as law, on ephemeral noninstrumental theory.
Ours is an extreme position. Essentially, we are building on Francis Crick’s Astonishing Hypothesis14 and Bruce Waller’s arguments
in Against Moral Responsibility.15 We are elaborating on Joshua
9. Merriam-Webster defines psychopath as a mentally unstable person. These persons
are usually identified by antisocial personalities marked by traits such as a lack of remorse
and an absence of empathy for others. See Psychopath, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/psychopath [https://perma.cc/N9EC-UNPU]. Psychopath is
not clinically recognized by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMV); the traditional symptoms associated with psychopathy are included under antisocial
personality disorder. See David Porter, Antisocial Personality Disorder DSM-5 301.7 (F60.2),
THERAVIVE, https://www.theravive.com/therapedia/antisocial-personality-disorder-dsm--5301.7-(f60.2) [https://perma.cc/C6T5-MNEH].
10. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 267.
11. See ALCES, supra note 8, at 66-67, 76; FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS:
THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 81-84 (1994).
12. See ALCES, supra note 8, at 76.
13. See id.; see also Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 1 NEUROETHICS 205, 210-11 (2008) (arguing that the law should be reformed to excuse those with
severe psychopathy from blame because they lack empathy, but that such psychopaths should
still be subject to civil confinement).
14. CRICK, supra note 11, at 3.
15. BRUCE N. WALLER, AGAINST MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 41 (2011).
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Greene and Jonathan Cohen’s conclusion that “For the Law,
Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything.”16 While we have
reservations about what can be concluded about free will from
Benjamin Libet’s science, we find much that makes good sense to us
in Daniel Wegner’s17 and Leonard Mlodinow’s18 reservations about
the substance of consciousness. Having located ourselves in the literature, starting with Butler, we explain what the law understands
human agency to be and demonstrate why the law profoundly
misunderstands matters.
Butler challenged us to understand the difference between disease and choice. Common wisdom (the irony is intentional) understands those two phenomena to be diametric opposites. As a
normative matter, disease is foisted upon you, choice is your own
creation, the product of an uncaused cause.19 But if there are no
uncaused causes, if, that is, we are not divine (because only the
divine is an uncaused cause in a mechanical universe), there is no
such thing as “choice.”20 And without choice there can be no moral
responsibility—no blame, no desert, no retribution, and no punishment (strictly construed).21 So, there is much at stake in understanding law’s dependence on the insubstantial choice fiction and
the mechanics that reveal that choice is a fiction.22
What we do in this Article is, first, demonstrate the law’s reliance
on an inauthentic conception of human agency. We trace that fundamental misapprehension through the three primary areas of the
law: contract, tort, and criminal law. In each area, the law reaches

16. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1775, 1784 (2004).
17. Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human
Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 545 (2008); DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF
CONSCIOUS WILL 2 (2002).
18. LEONARD MLODINOW, SUBLIMINAL: HOW YOUR UNCONSCIOUS MIND RULES YOUR BEHAVIOR 16-18 (2012).
19. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 142-43.
20. See ALCES, supra note 8, at 12-13.
21. See id. at 19-20; see also Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal
Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1787, 1787-88 (2004) (explaining
that epileptic seizures are not punished but historically were).
22. ALCES, supra note 8, at 41-42; DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 158
(2001).
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conclusions that actually undermine human thriving by relying on
a misconception of what it means to be human.23 “Consent” does not
mean what it needs to mean for the contract law to be coherent;
“fault” is a distraction if the object of the tort law is, as it should be,
to reduce the cost of accidents; and the criminal law, most obviously,
fails if it is based, albeit obliquely, on conceptions of moral responsibility that lack a reality referent.
The second part of the Article demonstrates why and how there
is no room for choice for uncaused causes in the human saga. Any
decision or event you can imagine has premises that trace from the
instant before the apparent choice and the time immemorial leading
up to that choice.24 We can no more choose to do something unconstrained by the forces that formed the current moment, including us
and our place in the current moment, than we could choose to be ten
feet tall or be a member of a different species.25 We are the culmination of forces over which we have nothing but the most ostensible
“control.”26 That control is wholly ostensible because it only seems
to be real.27 Now we recognize that “seeming” is quite convincing; it
is all we know, really.28 The illusion is convincing because it is adaptive; it is much of the story of our social evolution.29 Proof of that is
your inability to even imagine that you do not have free will, that
your consciousness does not reveal to you all you need to know to
make free choices.30 You may be able, at some level, to conceive of
yourself as a wholly determined creature, but you could not maintain that mental posture for very long.31 You would slip back into a
sense of willingness.
While we assert that free will is a fiction and that choice is an
illusion, we do not doubt that they are useful. Free will supports a
moral responsibility system that has served our species well
23. See Francis & Francis, supra note 6, at 53-54, 57-61; see also Soon et al., supra note
17, at 543-44 (experiment demonstrating that timing of decision could be predicted as early
as five seconds before the physical decision manifested).
24. Soon et al., supra note 17, at 543-44.
25. ALCES, supra note 8, at 35-36; Soon et al., supra note 17, at 543-44.
26. Soon et al., supra note 17, at 543-44.
27. WEGNER, supra note 17, at 2.
28. Id. at 3, 11.
29. Id. at 2, 146.
30. Id. at 2, 11.
31. Id. at 99, 151.
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(enough) for quite some time.32 And it is helpful to be able to rely on
the imposition of guilt and reward of praise to teach others (including one’s children, perhaps unwittingly) to behave in ways that will
promote social success, social cohesion, and human thriving.33 Free
will is helpful until it is not helpful. At some point, a point revealed
in much of the extant law, conceptions of free will, conclusions premised on the reality of unfettered choice, will actually undermine
human thriving, even though it might “feel good” in the instant.34
This Article is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. It is realistic.
We imagine that as the science matures, the law’s incoherence will
be manifest, and so will the incoherence of many of the institutions
that are founded on an inauthentic understanding of human
agency.35 When neuroscience tells us, more and more eloquently,
what it means to be human, we shall appreciate, more and more
fully, that the law errs in its assumptions about human agency and
errs in ways that not only frustrate, but undermine, law’s object.36
Just as witch trials seem absurd to us today, many of contemporary
law’s dictates will seem barbaric in the not-too-distant future.
Prosecute those addicted to controlled substances on account of their
consumption of the controlled substance? Wouldn’t that be like punishing someone for having a disease? Are we in Erewhon? Or our
own Nohwere?
I. INTIMATION OF UNDERSTANDING
The law need not commit to any particular conception of human
agency. It could, for example, impose liability on anyone for doing
or not doing anything that frustrates human thriving, as did the
Erewhonian courts in the prosecution of those who became ill
through no “fault” of their own.37 But there is something about law

32. Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 529-32 (1996).
33. Id. at 529.
34. See WALLER, supra note 15, at 135-37; Francis & Francis, supra note 6, at 53-54, 5761.
35. See PEREBOOM, supra note 22, at 158.
36. See id.; Soon et al., supra note 17, at 543-44; Francis & Francis, supra note 6, at 53-54,
57-61.
37. See WALLER, supra note 15, at 167.
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that at least seems to resonate with a felt sense of morality.38
Whether law consistently tracks a conception of morality (secular or
divine), it would be easier to discern the immanent sense of laws
that recognize, take account of, and even indulge human frailty.39
Such sensitivity is, arguably, basic to law in its three primary
compartments: contract, tort, and criminal liability.40 In this Part,
we shall demonstrate that sensitivity and endorse, even applaud,
law that takes into account the more complete conception of human
agency when determining the assignment of liability or the means
to mitigate or avoid liability altogether.
This Part shall draw on illustrations from each of the three primary areas of law to show what the law has done to accommodate
the realities of human agency. Initially, we would be favorably
impressed by the law’s acuity, and there is good reason to applaud
the law’s successes. But upon closer examination there is also something akin to a foreboding negative precedent. For present purposes,
we begin with the good news.
A. Contract: The “Intent to Be Bound”
Contract law concerns the consensual assumption of liability. My
ability to make an enforceable promise to you is of great value to
me—it enables me to exchange something I do not yet have (say, a
stream of income) for something I want from you now.41 That is
what a mortgagor does when she grants an encumbrance on real
property to facilitate acquisition of that property.42 Were that not
possible, she would have to wait until she had saved the full purchase price of a home before she could buy it and enjoy the very
material benefits of home ownership (which inure as well to all of
those in her society as they are enriched by her bounty too—for
example, sellers of appliances and lawncare service). Contract law

38. See Morse, supra note 32, at 530-32.
39. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566-69 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 14-15 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
40. See ALCES, supra note 8, at 21-24.
41. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (3d ed. 2014).
42. See id.
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turns the future promise to pay into present value.43 Contract, then,
done right, creates value.
In order to do contract “right,” we need a check on the assumption
of contract liability. That is the way we assure that exchanges accommodated by contract will create welfare—we each gain something more from the exchange than we surrender—rather than
rents (non-welfare producing exploitation of market position that
benefits only the rent seeker). The consent criterion is the “guarantor,” so to speak, of that welfare creation consistent with human
thriving.44 While I may make an objectively bad deal (for example,
hire someone to paint my home a color that will in fact impair its
market value), so long as I actually consent to the assumption of
contract liability, so long as I intend to contract, that is all we need
to assure that the legal machinery at contract’s disposal will create
value, no matter how idiosyncratic.45 The contract law need not account for taste to create welfare, but it does rely on actual consent
to sufficiently assure that the exchange will be welfare creating.46
Contract law is clear that “infants” (those under the age of eighteen) and those suffering from intellectual impairments do not have
capacity to contract.47 While minors may enter into contracts for
necessities, that exception is designed to protect minors, lest they
not be able to buy things such as food and medications.48 Protection
of those with intellectual limitations is not so easily discerned,
insofar as the mental incompetence may not be so clearly manifest.49
The law, then, focuses on the state of mind of the party who
attempts to enforce a contract with the mentally infirm.50 That
approach serves a certain sense of rough justice and would seem to

43. See HILLMAN, supra note 41, at 2.
44. ALCES, supra note 8, at 215.
45. See Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 237 (Minn. 1939) (demonstrating that
one can contract for a service to be done to his property even though the service may decrease
the property’s value).
46. Id.; see also Chunlin Leonhard, Dangerous or Benign Legal Fictions, Cognitive Biases,
and Consent in Contract Law, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 385, 405 (2017).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14-15 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
48. See id. § 12.
49. See, e.g., Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1378, 1385-86 (Del. Ch. 1992) (considering
the disparity in the parties’ intellectual abilities in determining unconscionability).
50. Id.
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punish those who have tried to take unconscientious advantage of
the vulnerable.
Neuroscience can inform inquiry into a putative contracting
party’s intellectual capacity and confirm what the behavioral evidence suggests. Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co.
illustrated such complementary use of neuroscientific insights.51
“The second witness, a neurologist, examined the results of Piper’s
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), found evidence of brain shrinkage and hardening of the arteries, and opined that the MRI was
consistent with dementia both at the time of the MRI and [at the
time Piper entered into the contract].”52 The MRI indicated “a
combination of Alzheimer’s disease and multi-infarct dementia” that
would have rendered Piper mentally incompetent both in law and
fact.53 It is important to note that the court used the neuroscientific
evidence to corroborate what the available behavioral evidence suggested: Piper had seemed disoriented in conversation and had also
filed a curious police report.54
So far, so good. We need not yet, at the veritable dawn of law and
neuroscience, rely on neuroscience alone to reach legal conclusions.
It is enough that neuroscience helps, that it affords us more confidence. Now we may imagine that, over time, we will gain increased
confidence in the power of neuroscience to support legal conclusions.
But until we can certainly diagnose Alzheimer’s-type dementia from
a brain scan, we cannot expect a brain scan to confirm that a subject
does not have legal capacity because she suffers from Alzheimer’stype dementia.55 There may be good reason to believe that as science
51. No. 215512, 2000 WL 33421451, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Until recently, researchers believed that amyloid plaques and tau tangles were correlative, if not the cause, of Alzheimer’s disease. However, recent studies of brain scans revealed
high levels of plaques and tangles in the brains of subjects who showed no extraordinary signs
of dementia, memory loss, or Alzheimer’s. Scientists believe this is attributable to genetic
resiliencies and greater cognitive reserve, which help compensate for damage caused by
plaques and tangles. As a result, however, brain scans alone cannot conclusively determine
whether an individual with a plaque-riddled brain has Alzheimer’s. Sharon Begley, They Have
‘Alzheimer’s Brains’ but No Symptoms. A New Wave of Drug Developers Wants to Know Why,
STAT (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/27/alzheimers-brains-but-nosymptoms/ [https://perma.cc/BRA3-Y4KH] (“You can have abundant plaques and tangles
without having Alzheimer’s disease.”).
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advances and billions of dollars in grant money are devoted to the
many challenges presented by Alzheimer’s disease, we will be able
to discover certain markers for the condition and even be able to
determine the extent of impairment resulting from a particular
constellation of those markers.56
A somewhat more prosaic example of contract law’s neuroscientific acuity is revealed in portions of the law that do not seem to
engage neuroscientific insights at all. Consider the “problem” of
form contracts and legally mandated contract disclosures.57 It is
clear, crystal clear, that people do not read forms and do not heed
boilerplate disclosures.58
Karl Llewellyn realized, or at least acknowledged, that fact well
before mainstream contracts jurisprudence took into account the
consequences for doctrine.59 If the very terms of a contract do not
certainly indicate the parties’ intent, the foundation of consensual
undertaking, then what are we to do with a writing that purports to
denote agreement when it is certainly not the measure of agreement? We may ignore such terms to the extent that they are not
reasonably indicative of the deal that the circumstances suggest the
parties actually intended. That was Llewellyn’s innovation, at least
in the context of sophisticated commercial transactions, well before
anyone imagined there was such a thing as “brain law.”60 Article 2
of Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code, the uniform law of the
land,61 provides that when the writings of the parties’ conflicting
forms diverge, the terms of their contract are those terms upon
which the forms do, in fact, agree as well as additional terms to
which we may reasonably expect the parties would agree.62
56. Alzheimer’s and Dementia Research, ALZHEIMER’S IMPACT MOVEMENT, https://alzim
pact.org/issues/research#:~:text=Today%2C%20funding%20for%20Alzheimer’s%20and,(NI
H)%20is%20%243.2%20billion [https://perma.cc/UB6D-YCSH].
57. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1745, 1748-50 (2014).
58. Leonhard, supra note 46, at 413.
59. ALCES, supra note 8, at 182.
60. One may wonder what the opposite of “brain law” might be: “brainless law”? Well, to
the extent that legal doctrine is inconsistent with neuroscientific reality it would, in perhaps
every sense, be “brainless.”
61. Article 2 of the U.C.C. has not been adopted by Louisiana. Commercial Law Research
Guide: Uniform Commercial Code, GEO. L. LIBR., https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/commercial
law/ucc [https://perma.cc/SV54-3F55].
62. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1978); see, e.g., Northrop Corp. v.
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Later commentators have recognized the limited extent to which
a complex writing accurately captures the parties’ intent, particularly in the context of transactions in which the boilerplate overwhelms the deal.63 Why would you read pages of legalisms to be sure
that all of your rights incident to a contract valued at less than,
say, ten dollars, are vindicated?64
Most of us, virtually all of us, assume that some, perhaps even all,
of the contracts terms to which we agree will never really matter, at
least beyond terms such as quantity, price, and delivery. So, ignorance of the fine print, even when it may not be so fine, is quite
rational.65 Contract terms, then, are most often redolent of the
parties’ intent without being definitive of that intent.66 The realization that humans are situationally rather than dispositionally
“wired”67 reflects the neuroscientific acuity of much of the extant
contract doctrine. The contract law, then, at least insofar as the
foundational intent requirement is concerned, passes neuroscientific muster in at least some contexts.
But what does the extant law of nonconsensual relations reveal
about the law’s appreciation of neuroscientific reality? Here, too,
there may be reason for optimism.
Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1994); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98-100 (3d Cir. 1991); Commc’ns Supply Corp. v. Iron Bow Techs., LLC,
No. 18-1374, 2021 WL 1176070, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021).
63. See, e.g., Leonhard, supra note 46, at 413; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 57, at 1748-50;
see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. For that matter, even if you are signing the closing documents for your $350,000
mortgage refinance, you might rationally decide not to peruse the terms to which you are
ostensibly agreeing once you realize that the terms are not negotiable anyway and you, rationally, assume that nothing is going to go wrong. See ALCES, supra note 8, at 187 (listing four
reasons reading consumer form contracts is not worth consumer’s time). You may also take
some solace in the fact that many others have signed essentially identical documents with no
ill effect and that surely some regulator somewhere has assured that you will not be taken
advantage of. Right?
65. Id.
66. That is certainly true of recurring consumer contracts, which may account for the
greatest number of contracts. But, as section 2-207 (Llewellyn’s innovation) demonstrated,
that is also true of many very sophisticated commercial contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1
(AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1978).
67. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective
on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 n.77 (2004); see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 139, 155 (2003).
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B. Tort: What It Means to “Hurt Someone”
Most of tort law is concerned with negligent actions that result in
harm, most generally personal injury. To the extent that tort law
imposes liability for intentional wrongdoing, it overlaps with the
criminal law, considered in the next Section. Plaintiffs may have
reason to bring intentional tort actions against defendants, particularly well-heeled (or, at least, well-insured) defendants. It is
significant too that the standard of proof in tort cases, “preponderance of the evidence,” will support plaintiffs’ recovery in cases even
though the state could not prevail in a criminal prosecution, where
the standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”68
Intent in the tort law is sensitive to neuroscientific realities, even
those that are easily and traditionally confirmed by behavioral
evidence. The cases demonstrate an understanding of the intellectual difference between a young child and a mature adult. For example, one of the canonical cases, Garratt v. Dailey, concerned the
intentional tort liability of a child five years and nine months old.69
Little Brian was visiting an adult, Naomi, when he pulled a chair
out from under Naomi’s sister Ruth Garratt as Ruth was about to
sit down on it.70 Ruth fell, fracturing her hip and suffering other
injuries.71 The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that it was not
necessary for the plaintiff to prove that Brian intended to harm
Ruth; rather, showing that Brian knew the necessary consequences
of his actions was sufficient to establish Brian’s tort liability.72 The
court explained that “[t]he only circumstance where Brian’s age is
of any consequence is in determining what he knew, and there his
experience, capacity, and understanding are of course material.”73
There is some difference of opinion among courts concerning the
imposition of intentional tort liability on children of a particularly
tender age. The Ohio Supreme Court refused to recognize the intentional tort liability of a child under the age of seven: “Our laws
68. KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (Robert P. Mosteller ed.,
8th ed. 2020).
69. 279 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Wash. 1955).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1094.
73. Id.
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and our moral concepts assume actors capable of legal and moral
choices, of which a young child is incapable.”74 Colorado reached the
opposite conclusion in a case in which three- and four-year-old defendants caused the death of a five-week-old infant.75
There is nothing particularly striking about the results in cases
involving conceptions of children’s intent in battery cases. And it is
only, for the briefest of moments, mildly surprising that mental
deficiency of the defendant is not pertinent in tort cases generally:
imposing liability based on the reasonable person standard when
the defendant does not have the intellectual capacity to be reasonable does incentivize those who are in the best position to monitor
such putative defendant’s behavior to do so.76
What is striking—in a good way—about intentional tort law’s
understanding of the reasons for insulating some children from
intentional tort liability is captured in the language of the Ohio
Supreme Court and its focus on mental “capacity” and “moral
choice[ ].”77 We may conclude, at this juncture at least, that the law
has it right: mental capacity is, as it should be, the measure of legal
liability. There is no more reason to believe that little Brian’s parents would be any less able or inclined to attend to his behavior
because of his age-related mental capacity than they would were he
mentally impaired for reasons unrelated to his youth.78 For now,
though, acknowledge that the tort law does take into account aspects of mental capacity that neuroscience may reveal, and to some
extent is already competent to reveal.79 While such neural characteristics have been most salient in criminal contexts,80 they would
be equally apposite in the civil tort setting.
It is, though, in criminal settings that the power of neuoroscientific insights on law is most salient.

74. See DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ohio 1975).
75. See Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304, 307-08 (Colo. 1974).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283(B) cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965).
77. DeLuca, 329 N.E.2d at 111.
78. See Garratt, 279 P.2d at 1092.
79. See Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n & the Missouri Psychological Ass’n as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 11-12, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.
03-633); Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 25-26, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 08-7412).
80. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
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C. Criminal Intent and Emotion
The facts are familiar, the stuff of so-called “bodice-rippers”:
Frankie and Johnny were sweethearts, and after several years of a
devoted, if torrid, relationship, Johnny’s affections are “alienated”
by Brenda (perhaps after her break-up with Eddie, of Brenda and
Eddie fame).81 True to Hollywood form, Frankie walks in on Johnny
and Brenda and “Frankie took aim with her forty-four/Five times
with a rooty-toot-toot.”82 It is, of course, ironic, that the once-popular
song identified the wronged woman as the murderer while the
decided cases have generally involved cuckolded men. The question
though remains clear: Is a homicide committed “in the heat of
passion” murder? If it is not murder, but some lesser degree of
homicide, the criminal penalty would be much diminished; query
whether there should be a penalty at all.
The doctrine and cases are clear that first degree, premeditated
murder is “worse” from the perspective of the law, if not from the
perspective of the victim. It may be necessary to wonder why that
is so, but first consider some illustrative cases.
James Clark Thornton was convicted of murder in the first degree
for the homicide of his estranged wife’s paramour, Mark
McConkey.83 While the defendant and his wife were separated, but
before Mrs. Thornton’s attorney filed her divorce petition, the deceased had begun an amorous relationship with the soon-to-be exMrs. Thornton with her husband’s knowledge.84 Aware of that relationship, Thornton showed up at the home of his wife, discovered
her and McConkey in medias sexual relations, and shot McConkey.85
Now whether there was evidence of the type of premeditation that
would support a first degree murder conviction is, for present purposes, beside the point.86 The case is pertinent here for the court’s
observations regarding the defendant’s “heat of passion”:
81. LEIGHTON BROS. & REN SHIELDS, Frankie & Johnny (Tell Taylor Music Publisher
1912).
82. Id.
83. State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 309 (Tenn. 1987).
84. Id. at 309-11.
85. Id. at 311-12.
86. Though, indeed, it would seem that the defendant had time for reflection: he left and
came back with a gun and camera. Id. at 311.
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[I]t has long been a well-settled legal principle that the commission of unlawful sexual intercourse with a female relative is an
act obviously calculated to arouse ungovernable passion, and
that the killing of the seducer or adulterer under the influence
or in the heat of that passion constitutes voluntary manslaughter, and not murder, in the absence of evidence of actual
malice.87

The court relied on precedent in the jurisdiction.88
Indeed, it did not even matter whether defendant Thornton actually was experiencing the emotional upset the court attributed to
him. What matters is the doctrine’s recognition that intent may be
vitiated by emotional reaction, that there is a legally significant
difference between mental states pertinent to punishment. That
difference must matter, in either noninstrumental (probably deontological89) or instrumental terms. So the defendant acting in
response to particularly salient emotional provocation is either less
culpable or presents less of a threat going forward than the contracted “hitman,” who kills in a more “cold-blooded” way.
That distinction could make some sense. And if you believe that
noninstrumentalism is anything more than the rationalization of
emotional reaction (rather than just a more saliently visceral reaction to phenomena), the deontological “tug” of that rationalization
may convince you that the distinction the doctrine discovers makes
some kind of sense. You could also come to terms with the posited
distinction in wholly instrumental terms: someone who catches his
recently estranged romantic partner in pare delicto with another
might pose less of a threat to others whom he does not discover in
such circumstances. Either way, the difference seems to rely on a
basis of justification unavailable when the killing is premeditated.
Perhaps there is some sense that the defendant is less guilty if we
can more easily appreciate, if not empathize with, the defendant’s
neural (in the event, “emotional”) state. You get the sense that
87. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 312-13 (quoting Toler v. State, 260 S.W.134, 137 (Tenn. 1924)).
89. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., 1998) (providing Kant’s deontological argument for the categorical imperative, which advocates for moral behavior out of a sense of duty rather than utilitarian
interests).
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somehow the provocation undermined the defendant’s self-control,
which, of course, posits a “self” somehow “in control.”90
In similar regard, consider the now infamous case of “Spyder
Cystkopf.”91 Herbert Weinstein strangled his wife and threw her
body out of the window of their twelfth-floor Manhattan apartment.92 The marriage had been troubled for some time: Weinstein
researched how to kill by poisoning and had incurred significant
gambling debts.93 He also made an effort to make it appear as
though his wife had taken her own life by jumping out of the
apartment window.94 So, there was evidence of the kind of premeditation that would undermine a defense based on impaired neural
capacity.95 And that was significant because Mr. Weinstein’s defense
counsel wanted to introduce neuroscientific evidence of an arachnoid cyst that had formed on Mr. Weinstein’s frontal lobe, an area
associated with so-called “executive function”—the ability to exert
control over, and so avoid, impulsive actions.96
The issue in the case was whether the defense could introduce
particular neuroscientific evidence: position emission tomography
(PET)97 and skin conductance response (SCR)98 test results. The
court reasoned:

90. ALCES, supra note 8, at 10.
91. “Spyder Cystkopf” is the pseudonym given to defendant Herbert Weinstein in the real
case, People v. Weinstein. 591 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Crim. Ct. 1992). The pseudonyms of the defendant and his victim were given by Dr. Daniel Martell in his analysis of the case and used in
Morse’s analysis. Morse, supra note 32, at 527 n.1.
92. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717; see also KEVIN DAVIS, THE BRAIN DEFENSE: MURDER
IN MANHATTAN AND THE DAWN OF NEUROSCIENCE IN AMERICA’S COURTROOMS 10 (2017).
93. DAVIS, supra note 92, at 120-121.
94. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Morse, supra note 32, at 537; DAVIS, supra note 92,
at 10.
95. See Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
96. Id. at 722-23; Morse, supra note 32, at 539-41.
97. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717-18; see also Susan E. Rushing, The Admissibility of
Brain Scans in Criminal Trials: The Case of Positron Emission Tomography, 50 CT. REV. 62,
62-64 (2014) (discussing PET scans and the Weinstein court’s decision to admit them); J.
Rojas-Burke, PET Scans Advance as Tool in Insanity Defense, 34 J. NUCLEAR MED. 13N, 25N,
26N (1993) (discussing the debate surrounding the Weinstein court’s admittance of PET scans
and its implications for future litigation).
98. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717-18; see Antonio R. Damasio et al., Individuals with
Sociopathic Behavior Caused by Frontal Damage Fail to Respond Autonomically to Social
Stimuli, 41 BEHAV. BRAIN RSCH. 81, 90-92 (1990).
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[T]he admissibility of the results of these tests depends upon
whether it would be reasonable for the psychiatrist to consider
these results with other available information in forming a diagnosis that Weinstein’s cognitive ability was so impaired at the
time he allegedly killed his wife that he was not responsible for
his conduct.99

The court found that it would be reasonable for the expert psychiatrist to consider the tests’ results.100 While the ruling did not
ultimately lead to Mr. Weinstein’s exoneration (and there is good
reason to believe that it should not have),101 it is important—for the
law and neuroscience story—that the court’s unwillingness to exclude the neuroscientific evidence may well have encouraged the
prosecution to enter into a plea agreement that it otherwise would
have been disinclined to entertain,102 saving Mr. Weinstein perhaps
fifteen years of incarceration.
Most significant is the court’s casting its inquiry in terms of Mr.
Weinstein’s “responsibility”: the neuroscientific evidence could be
probative of Mr. Weinstein’s criminal responsibility.103 But in what
sense? Surely there was no factual question regarding Mr. Weinstein’s causal responsibility for his wife’s death. What remained at
issue, then, was a normative measure of responsibility. For the perspective urged in this Article, that is encouraging: the recognition
that neural state may be probative of normative responsibility in a
way that could determine application and operation of legal
doctrine.
One final case study focuses the thought experiment. Mr. Oft
(pseudonym) was a forty-year-old school teacher who was married
and had a stepdaughter.104 Though he had, since adolescence, maintained an interest in pornography, he had no history of sexual
predation or violence.105 But then, somewhat suddenly, he developed
99. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 724.
101. See Morse, supra note 32, at 540-41; DAVIS, supra note 92, at 120-21, 152, 183-84.
102. Kevin Davis, Brain Trials: Neuroscience Is Taking a Stand in the Courtroom, A.B.A.
J., Nov. 2012, at 40-41.
103. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717, 724-25.
104. Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, 13 LAW
& NEUROSCIENCE 529, 559-60 (2010).
105. Id. at 559.
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an interest in child pornography and started visiting child pornography websites.106 Then he began to solicit prostitutes.107 When he
made sexual advances toward his stepdaughter, she told her mother
and Oft was convicted of child molestation.108 He was sentenced to
an inpatient rehabilitation program instead of prison, but was expelled from that program when his inappropriate sexual behavior
continued.109
The evening before he was to be sentenced to prison, Oft was
admitted to the hospital after complaining of a severe headache.110
While in the hospital that evening, he continued his inappropriate
behavior.111 Further behavioral anomalies caused the attending
doctor to order an MRI, which revealed a large orbitofrontal tumor.112 Following surgical removal of the tumor, Oft returned to
normal, engaging in no inappropriate sexual behavior.113 But about
a year later, the inappropriate sexual behavior began again.114 An
MRI indicated that the tumor had regrown.115 The new tumor was
successfully removed, with the same favorable results that followed
the first excision.116
Well, what do you want to do? Should Oft be incarcerated? Was
he “responsible” for what the tumor made him do? Perhaps we could
“incarcerate” the tumor by leaving it in a jar on a shelf. In order to
appreciate the power of the thought experiment, you must assume
that after the second surgery, Oft’s predatory inclinations expired
with the tumor. He presents no risk going forward and the efficient
cause of the crimes he perpetrated before the second surgery no
longer exists. If we now punish Oft, who or what, exactly, are we
punishing? And, most pertinently here, how do conceptions of intent
function to inform application of the criminal law?
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 559-60.
113. Id. at 560.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also ALCES, supra note 8, at 15-21 (reviewing Morse’s analysis of the Oft case
to illustrate how empirical breakthroughs may reshape conceptual legal challenges).
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II. THE FOLK PSYCHOLOGY OF “INTENT” IN LAW
To be clear, describing psychology as “folk” is not to disparage it:
we all function by assuming the essential reality of folk psychology.
Indeed, we would be unable to function without it. Folk psychology
at least assumes, if it does not posit, the reality of beliefs, desires,
and motives (BDM). I do not have to inquire into the neural incidents of your belief in order to come to terms with it for purposes
of everyday social intercourse. We can define “belief” if we like, but
that would rarely be necessary. What matters is that by your
claiming to believe something, or my attributing a belief to you, we
are establishing certain parameters of communication and social
engagement. So, too, I know what you mean when you describe a
desire or attribute a motive to someone. Folk psychology acknowledges that such abstractions perform important social coordination
objects by facilitating communication.
But folk psychology is an abstraction made generally efficacious
only by reference to its object. We could not imagine saying to the
neurosurgeon “remove Oft’s preoccupation with sexual predation.”
But we could say, “remove the tumor (that is, alter his brain structure) that is causing Oft to be a sexual predator.” Neuroscience does
not undermine folk psychology; it limits folk psychological conceptions to their appropriate domain: social settings in which BDM
serve useful but not confounding purposes, in which BDM operate
at the right level of abstraction.
“Intent” in law is such a folk psychological conception. It can tell
us when and how the law should intervene. For example, it can tell
us when an exchange will be welfare-creating (contract), when
victim compensation and perpetrator disincentive meet in just the
right way to justify civil relief (tort), and when the social interest
has been compromised sufficiently to enlist the punitive power of
the state (criminal law).117 That is quite a lot to ask a folk psychological concept to do. We should not be surprised that it does not do it
well.

117. See supra Part I.
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Further, intent only can work to vindicate any social object if we
first agree on the normative character of that object. To oversimplify
without sacrificing any necessary acuity, we need to divide the
normative universe into two components: the instrumental and the
noninstrumental. The incidents of both are accessible: instrumental
responses are forward-looking, like general and specific deterrence;
noninstrumental responses are backward-looking, like retribution
and revenge.118 Before we can have any sense of whether “intent” is
a helpful marker on our normative path, we need to know where the
path is headed. Even then, at some point we must come to terms
with the constituents of intent. But fixing our normative object is
fundamental.
For exemplary purposes, consider again the case of Oft.119 Though
his intent was resectioned, the other incidents of “Oft-ness” remain.
Does “enough” of Oft remain to support a noninstrumental response
to his presurgery actions? From the instrumental perspective, what
object would be served by “post-surgery Oft’s” incarceration? Keep
in mind, there will be costs to imprisoning him—some easily and
others not-so-easily quantifiable. Will those costs outweigh the general and specific benefits derived from his incarceration? For
instance, what message, if any, would be sent to others considering
sexual predation were we to return Oft to his pre-tumor life? And if
that is the “math” we would have to perform to realize a normative
object, how do folk-psychological conceptions of intent accommodate
the calculation?
Further, cognitive neuroscience provides means to dig deeper
than folk psychology would let us go. In fact, cognitive neuroscience
could correct mistakes that would frustrate our normative object if
we were to stop instead at the folk-psychological level of abstraction
when that level would be impotent to realize (rather than frustrate)
our normative object. Our argument is that the barrier to law’s vindicating its normative objects is the law’s reliance on the historically
more accessible folk psychology shadows when appreciation of cognitive neuroscience can now provide better light. We can understand
118. It is not clear that there really is a difference between the two, though we can say
individuals exact revenge and states impose retributionary punishment. It probably feels the
same from the perspective of the object of the punishment.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 104-16.
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why legal doctrine, the product of less enlightened times, speaks the
language of folk psychology; we cannot understand why it settles for
that (potentially misleading) level of acuity and inquiry when a
paradigm more aligned with every conceivable normative object is
available.120 And that paradigm more accurately depicts what it
means to be human.121
Yet we are encouraged by law’s engagement with neuroscientific
realities when such realities are manifest. The contract, tort, and
criminal law contexts in the first part of our story are success
stories; we applaud them.122 But it is just as important to recognize
that the law’s deference to neuroscience realties stops (abruptly)
and that the impediment to the law’s engagement with neuroscientific insights is a matter of empirical limitation, not conceptual
confusion.123 The law goes as far as it can with cognitive neuroscience, dismissing folk psychological conceptions, but then regresses
to folk psychology’s look through the glass darkly when the science
has not yet taken us far enough.124 It is as though secular thinking
can take us only so far, and then we must fall back on superstition
when we cannot understand the phenomena empirically.125 Human
agents are, then, in the eyes of the law, mechanistically determined
entities, so far as we understand the mechanism.126 Then, when our
current empirical understanding runs into an empirical wall, we
reconstitute human agency in divine or pseudoscientific terms, as
an uncaused cause.127 That is a grave error, as the science reveals.128
III. THE NON-VOLITIONAL BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF INTENT
The process of adjudicating criminal law seems appropriately
concerned with intent and all of the potential subtleties attached to

120. See ALCES, supra note 8, at 2.
121. See id.
122. See generally supra Part I (discussing states of mind in relation to contract, tort, and
criminal law).
123. See ALCES, supra note 8, at 14-21.
124. See id. at 7-10, 14-21.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 19.
127. See id. at 32-34.
128. See id.
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it129: Did the defendant intend to break the law? Was the breaking
unintentional, but nevertheless occurred while the person was intent on breaking a different law? Or as some Frankfurt counterfactual,130 did the defendant break the law, unaware that if they had
decided to do otherwise, they would have been coerced to do so? The
legal system’s appropriate interest in intent is more than offset by
its relative indifference to a crucial follow-up question: Where did
that intent come from?131 It is our contention that this indifference
is a myopia that leaves the legal system fatally flawed.132 As
neuroscience and its related disciplines show, this is because we are
not the authors of our intentions.133
This indifference can be appreciated with the example of Mr.
Oft.134 There is no question that he intended to molest his stepdaughter, in that it was not an accident, nor was he coerced to do so
by an external force.135 Where did that intent come from? The case’s
starkness reflects how clear the improbable answer is, which is that
the orbitofrontal brain tumor caused it.136 One can get lost in neurological minutia about causal determinism—was the criminal
intent caused by the oncogene whose activation prompted the tumor
growth, by the tumor which compressed Oft’s cerebral blood vessels,
or by the death of neurons due to the lack of oxygen from those
blood vessels?137 Regardless, Oft’s criminal intent was caused by the
tumor, not by Oft, with the causality flagrantly shown by the

129. See id. at 23-24.
130. See Dana K. Nelkin, Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals, 121 PHIL.
STUD. 1, 1-2 (2004) (describing a Frankfurt counterfactual as a scenario in which a person
deliberates between actions X and Y and voluntarily decides to perform X, but there is a
“counterfactual intervener” who would have caused the person to perform X if the person
chose not to do so voluntarily).
131. See ALCES, supra note 8, at 97 (discussing how one cannot know precisely why another
acted the way he or she did).
132. See id. at 4.
133. See id. at 43.
134. See Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 437, 437-40
(2003); Morse, supra note 104, at 559-62.
135. See Morse, supra note 104, at 537-40, 559-62.
136. See id.
137. See id.; Subramoniam Madhusoodanan et al., Psychiatric Aspects of Brain Tumors: A
Review, 5 WORLD J. PSYCHIATRY 273, 282 (2015).
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behavior repeatedly waxing and waning as the tumor grew, was
removed, regrew, and was removed yet again.138
It is easy to see how Oft’s tumor challenges a legal system
equating intent with responsibility or volition.139 But it is not the
sort of case that can be generalized easily enough to revolutionize
legal thinking. This is because of the uniqueness of its clarity, where
massively abnormal behavior is caused by the singular and massive
abnormality of a brain tumor, literally demonstrable at the scene of
the crime. What contemporary science shows is that the intent behind our best and worst behaviors, and all those ambiguously in
between, is as much the end product of factors outside our control
as was Oft’s intentional criminality.140 However, it is far harder to
appreciate this than the case of Oft for at least three reasons: (1)
unlike the singularity of his tumor, our behavior mostly arises from
a multitude of biological factors that subtly interact, (2) no single
factor has remotely the overt sledgehammer causality of a tumor,
and (3) many of the factors were set into action long before the
behavior occurred (with some even long before the individual in
question was born).141 One can appreciate this with the following
tour of the varied biological roots of intent that drive our behavior.
Consider an individual who unexpectedly finds himself interacting with a stranger, a member of an out-group with which our
protagonist and his in-group have had a long history of animosity.142
That stranger’s appearance—clothing, style of facial hair or head
covering, an armband, pendant, or tattoo—reifies that animosity.143
The two interact, tensely, and at some point, the stranger says
something fraught with ambiguity. An outside observer might
readily perceive the stranger’s words as relatively neutral.144 In contrast, the protagonist views them as threatening and provocative,
138. See Morse, supra note 104, at 559-62.
139. See id.; ALCES, supra note 8, at 43.
140. See Morse, supra note 104, at 559-62; Nelkin, supra note 130, at 1-2 (providing an
example of how a factor outside one’s control can lead one to behave in a certain manner).
141. See Morse, supra note 104, at 559-62; ALCES, supra note 8, at 49-63.
142. See generally Chad E. Forbes et al., Negative Stereotype Activation Alters Interaction
Between Neural Correlates of Arousal, Inhibition & Cognitive Control, 7 SOC. COGNITIVE &
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 771, 771-72 (2012) (discussing stereotype activation when encountering out-group members).
143. See id. at 777-78.
144. See generally id.
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as offensive to values that the protagonist and his group find
sacred.145 The protagonist reaches for a gun, and has a brief swirl of
conflicting thoughts and feelings about whether to shoot: a knowledge that he is likely to be caught; a memory of a loved one whom
this out-group victimized; a fear that the stranger is also armed and
would shoot without hesitation; a consideration that he should just
walk away; a flash of a hateful, dehumanizing trope about this outgroup; a millisecond’s thought that maybe he misinterpreted what
the guy had said; a flashing pleasure at the prospects of being
strong, decisive, and dangerous. The protagonist pulls out the gun,
and intentionally pulls the trigger.
This is where, in many ways, the legal system stops,146 but instead, it is where the legal system should ask: Where did that intent
come from?147
The weighing and balancing of those conflicting thoughts is the
purview of the frontal cortex, receiving inputs from throughout the
brain concerning emotions, memories, thoughts, and habits.148 It is
the brain region that makes executive decisions as to what counts
as the right thing to do under the circumstances and helps supply
the emotional regulation and impulse control that one might need
to actually do the right thing.149
A variety of events in the preceding seconds to minutes, none of
which the protagonist would have been consciously aware of, tilt
that frontal cortex in the direction of intentionally pulling the
trigger.150 That tilting would be facilitated by a variety of sensory
information—for example, if music was playing in the background
that the protagonist associates with that hated out-group, he would
be more likely to find the stranger to be more threatening.151 If there
was a bad smell in the room or a bad taste in his mouth, he would
See generally id.
See ALCES, supra note 8, at 14-21.
See id. at 97.
See CHARLES R. NOBACK ET AL., THE HUMAN NERVOUS SYSTEM: STRUCTURE &
FUNCTION 390-99 (6th ed. 2005).
149. Id.
150. See Forbes et al., supra note 142, at 772, 777-78; Katie Liljenquist et al., The Smell
of Virtue: Clean Scents Promote Reciprocity & Charity, 21 PSYCH. SCI. 381, 381-82 (2010);
Kenneth L. Dion, Intergroup Conflict and Intragroup Cohesiveness, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 219 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979).
151. See Forbes et al., supra note 142, at 772, 779.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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be more likely to judge the stranger more harshly.152 If he had just
walked past a place of symbolic significance to his in-group (for
example, a place of worship), he would be more likely to shoot.153 If
the protagonist is heterosexual, he would be more likely to shoot if
a woman were present, but only if he considered her to be attractive.154 The protagonist’s internal state shapes the frontal cortex’s
executive decision.155 If he had been performing a difficult, frontally
dependent task or is sleep-deprived, the metabolism of the very
costly frontal cortex would be blunted, weakening its capacity to
control impulses.156 He would be more likely to pull the trigger if he
is in pain.157 Likewise, if he is hungry; his frontal function would be
strengthened if he had recently consumed a sugary drink, but not
if the drink contained a noncaloric artificial sweetener.158 And none
of these factors would be in his conscious awareness as he deliberates whether to shoot.159
Factors outside his control or awareness were also in play in the
hours to days before he formed the intent to shoot. If, because of
daily or seasonal fluctuations, the levels of testosterone in his bloodstream had been rising, he would be more likely to perceive a
neutral facial expression as a threatening one.160 The hormone
would have lessened the excitability of neurons in the frontal cortex,
while doing the opposite in the amygdala, a brain region central to
fear and aggression; as a result, amygdaloid activity would be more
likely to dominate that of the frontal cortex, rather than the
reverse.161 Moreover, testosterone would also have made him more
152. See id.; Liljenquist et al., supra note 150, at 381-82.
153. See Dion, supra note 150, at 219.
154. See Karen Dion et al., What Is Beautiful Is Good, 24 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
285, 288 (1972).
155. See Ashley Acheson et al., Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Impulsive Behaviors in Men
and Women, 91 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 579, 579-80 (2007).
156. See id.
157. See Nina Attridge et al., People in Pain Make Poorer Decisions, 160 PAIN 1662, 1668-69
(2019).
158. See Matthew T. Gailliot & Roy F. Baumeister, The Physiology of Willpower: Linking
Blood Glucose to Self-Control, 92 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 303, 319-22 (2007).
159. See Forbes et al., supra note 142, at 772, 777-78; Liljenquist et al., supra note 150, at
381-82; Dion, supra note 150, at 219.
160. See Flávia L. Osório et al., Sex Hormones and Processing of Facial Expressions of
Emotion: A Systematic Literature Review, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCH., Apr. 2018, at 2, 10-11.
161. See Birgit Derntl et al., Amygdala Activity to Fear and Anger in Healthy Young Males
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likely to inaccurately overestimate the likelihood of a successful
outcome to his actions.162 On another endocrine front, if levels of the
hormone oxytocin had been rising in his bloodstream, he would
manifest an increased sense of in-group favoritism; in a game, he
would be more likely to cheat or be preemptively aggressive to an
out-group member, would feel more envy of an out-group success,
more gloating schadenfreude at their failure.163 If he experienced
rising levels of stress hormones—such as cortisol—in those preceding hours, his amygdala neurons would become more excitable,
frontal neurons less so.164 As a result, pathways in the brain mediating habitual, preservative actions would strengthen, whereas risk
aversion and empathy would decrease.165 All of these effects are
understood down to the level of individual cells, molecules, and
genes, and all would be outside our protagonist’s conscious awareness.166
Events in the prior weeks, months, and even recent years would
also have helped create his intent to pull the trigger, a reflection of
the ability of the brain to change in response to experience.167 To
begin, different brain regions increase or decrease their number of
Is Associated with Testosterone, 34 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 687, 688 (2009).
162. See Nicholas D. Wright et al., Testosterone Disrupts Human Collaboration by Increasing Egocentric Choices, 279 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B 2275, 2278 (2012).
163. For more information on how oxytocin impacts behavior, see generally Carsten K. W.
De Dreu et al., Oxytocin Promotes Human Ethnocentrism, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 1262,
1264 (2011) (explaining oxytocin’s effects on group bias); Thomas Baumgartner et al., Oxytocin
Shapes the Neural Circuitry of Trust and Trust Adaptation in Humans, 58 NEURON 639, 644
(2008); Carolyn H. Declerck et al., Oxytocin and Cooperation Under Conditions of Uncertainty:
The Modulating Role of Incentives and Social Information, 57 HORMONES & BEHAV. 368, 372
(2010); Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory et al., Intranasal Administration of Oxytocin Increases Envy
and Schadenfreude (Gloating), 66 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 864 (2009) (explaining oxytocin’s
effects on feelings of envy and gloating toward out-groups).
164. See Bruce S. McEwen et al., Stress Effects on Neuronal Structure: Hippocampus,
Amygdala, and Prefrontal Cortex, 41 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 3, 14-16 (2016).
165. See Samuel Bendahan et al., Acute Stress Alters Individual Risk Taking in a TimeDependent Manner and Leads to Anti-Social Risk, 45 EUR. J. NEUROSCIENCE 877, 878 (2017).
166. See Osório et al., supra note 160, at 2, 10-11; De Dreu et al., supra note 163, at 1264;
McEwen et al., supra note 164, at 14-16.
167. See Anthony Holtmaat & Karel Svoboda, Experience-Dependent Structural Synaptic
Plasticity in the Mammalian Brain, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 647, 652-53 (2009);
Catherine S. Woolley et al., Naturally Occurring Fluctuation in Dendritic Spine Density on
Adult Hippocampal Pyramidal Neurons, 10 J. NEUROSCIENCE 4035, 4038 (1990); Wolfgang
Kelsch et al., Watching Synaptogenesis in the Adult Brain, 33 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 131,
143 (2010).
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synapses, depending on the experience.168 Moreover, experience
changes the complexity and targeting of neuronal cables linking one
brain region to another, altering how effectively the two integrate
their function.169 Furthermore, varying experiences will differentially affect the numbers of different types of brain cells as some
are born and others die.170 Collectively, these cellular and subcellular changes are impactful enough so that the actual size of
different brain regions will change.171 If the protagonist suffered
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to an unspeakable
trauma in his past, his amygdala would likely have slowly grown
larger and more reactive; if he had been enduring months of the
major stress of, say, unemployment, his frontal cortex would likely

168. See Holtmaat & Svoboda, supra note 167, at 651; Catherine Lord et al., Hippocampal
Volumes Are Larger in Postmenopausal Women Using Estrogen Therapy Compared to Past
Users, Never Users and Men: A Possible Window of Opportunity Effect, 29 NEUROBIOLOGY
AGING 95, 96 (2008); Robert M. Sapolsky, Glucocorticoids & Hippocampal Atrophy in Neuropsychiatric Disorders, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 925, 926 (2000); Amelia A. Mutso et al.,
Abnormalities in Hippocampal Functioning with Persistent Pain, 32 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5747,
5753 (2012); Jens C. Pruessner et al., Stress Regulation in the Central Nervous System:
Evidence from Structural and Functional Neuroimaging Studies in Human Populations, 35
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 179, 179-80 (2010); Janice R. Kuo et al., Amygdala Volume in
Combat-Exposed Veterans with and Without Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Cross-Sectional
Study, 69 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1080, 1082-83 (2012).
169. See Eduardo Dias-Ferreira et al., Chronic Stress Causes Frontostriatal Reorganization
and Affects Decision-Making, 325 SCI. 621, 625 (2009); Manabu Fuchikami et al., Epigenetic
Regulation of BDNF Gene in Response to Stress, 7 PSYCHIATRY INVESTIGATION 251, 251 (2010).
170. See A. M. Magariños & B. S. McEwen, Stress-Induced Atrophy of Apical Dendrites of
Hippocampal CA3c Neurons: Involvement of Glucocorticoid Secretion and Excitatory Amino
Acid Receptors, 69 NEUROSCIENCE 89 (1995); Ana María Magariños et al., Chronic Psychosocial Stress Causes Apical Dendritic Atrophy of Hippocampal CA3 Pyramidal Neurons in
Subordinate Tree Shrews, 16 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3534, 3539 (1996); Brennan D. Eadie et al.,
Voluntary Exercise Alters the Cytoarchitecture of the Adult Dentate Gyrus by Increasing
Cellular Proliferation, Dendritic Complexity, and Spine Density, 486 J. COMPAR. NEUROLOGY
39, 43 (2005); see also Mohammad M. Khan et al., Estrogen Regulation of Spine Density and
Excitatory Synapses in Rat Prefrontal and Somatosensory Cerebral Cortex, 78 STEROIDS 614,
615 (2013); Bruce McEwen, Estrogen Actions Throughout the Brain, 57 RECENT PROGRESS
HORMONE RSCH. 357, 362 (2002); Benedetta Leuner & Elizabeth Gould, Structural Plasticity
and Hippocampal Function, 61 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 111, 113 (2010).
171. See Eleanor A. Maguire et al., Navigation-Related Structural Change in the Hippocampi of Taxi Drivers, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4398, 4402 (2000); Katherine Woollett &
Eleanor A. Maguire, Acquiring “the Knowledge” of London’s Layout Drives Structural Brain
Changes, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 2109, 2112 (2011).
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have atrophied and become less effective.172 These events are all
outside his control.173
We now consider the construction of the protagonist’s brain in the
first place, during childhood. Here are some of the factors early in
life that would have been detrimental to the development of his
frontal cortex and its capacity to regulate his emotions: if he had
witnessed or been subject to physical, psychological, or sexual abuse
or to emotional or physical neglect;174 if he had a family member
who was mentally ill, incarcerated, or a substance abuser;175 or if he
had been chronically exposed to environmental neurotoxins such as
lead.176 As another factor, if the protagonist had been born poor, by
age five, he would have already been more likely than chance to
have an underdeveloped and less effective frontal cortex.177 Moreover,
172. See ERIC R. KANDEL, THE DISORDERED MIND: WHAT UNUSUAL BRAINS TELL US ABOUT
OURSELVES 185-86 (2018).
173. See Osório et al., supra note 160, at 2, 10-11.
174. See Constance Hammen et al., Depression and Sensitization to Stressors Among Young
Women as a Function of Childhood Adversity, 68 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 782, 786
(2000); Eamon McCrory et al., The Link Between Child Abuse and Psychopathology: A Review
of Neurobiological and Genetic Research, 105 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 151, 151-52 (2012); Kevin
Lalor & Rosaleen McElvaney, Child Sexual Abuse, Links to Later Sexual Exploitation/HighRisk Sexual Behavior, and Prevention/Treatment Programs, 11 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE
159, 163 (2010); Yael Dvir et al., Childhood Maltreatment, Emotional Dysregulation, and Psychiatric Comorbidities, 22 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 149, 151 (2014); Enrico Mezzacappa et al.,
Child Abuse and Performance Task Assessments of Executive Functions in Boys, 42 J. CHILD
PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1041 (2001); Marieke Wichers et al., Transition from Stress
Sensitivity to a Depressive State: Longitudinal Twin Study, 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 498, 501
(2009).
175. See Lalor & McElvaney, supra note 174, at 163.
176. See Rick Nevin, Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy of Preschool
Lead Exposure, 104 ENV’T RSCH. 315, 317-19 (2007).
177. See Sonia J. Lupien et al., Effects of Stress Throughout the Lifespan on the Brain,
Behaviour and Cognition, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 434, 438 (2009); Daniel A.
Hackman et al., Socioeconomic Status and the Brain: Mechanistic Insights from Human and
Animal Research, 11 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 651, 654 (2010); Margaret A. Sheridan et
al., The Impact of Social Disparity on Prefrontal Function in Childhood, 7 PLOS ONE, Apr.
2012, at 1, 2-3; Jamie L. Hanson et al., Structural Variations in Prefrontal Cortex Mediate the
Relationship Between Early Childhood Stress and Spatial Working Memory, 32 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7917, 7918 (2012); Maggie M. Sweitzer et al., Polymorphic Variation in the Dopamine
D4 Receptor Predicts Delay Discounting as a Function of Childhood Socioeconomic Status:
Evidence for Differential Susceptibility, 9 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 499,
502-03 (2013); Elliot M. Tucker-Drob et al., Emergence of a Gene X Socioeconomic Status
Interaction on Infant Mental Ability Between 10 Months and 2 Years, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 125, 125
(2011); Israel Liberzon et al., Childhood Poverty and Recruitment of Adult Emotion Regulatory
Neurocircuitry, 10 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1596, 1596 (2015); Kimberly
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these adverse childhood experiences would have caused epigenetic
changes in gene regulation in his brain that are potentially lifelong.178 Commensurate with that, a developmental history would not
only have increased the likelihood of his pulling that trigger, but of
other forms of antisocial behavior as well, along with low educational and occupational attainment and poor health.179
Separate from these examples of adversity, early life cultural
influences would have shaped the development of the protagonist’s
brain.180 For example, if he had been raised in the rural American
South with its culture of honor, he would be more likely than other
G. Noble et al., Family Income, Parental Education, and Brain Structure in Children and
Adolescents, 18 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 773, 773 (2015).
178. See Nadine Provencal et al., The Signature of Maternal Rearing in the Methylome in
Rhesus Macaque Prefrontal Cortex and T Cells, 32 J. NEUROSCIENCE 15626, 15626 (2012);
Tania L. Roth et al., Lasting Epigenetic Influence of Early-Life Adversity on the BDNF Gene,
65 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 760, 760 (2009); E.C. Braithwaite et al., Maternal Prenatal Depressive Symptoms Predict Infant NR3C1 1F and BDNF IV DNA Methylation, 10 EPIGENETICS
408, 408 (2015); Chris Murgatroyd et al., Dynamic DNA Methylation Programs Persistent
Adverse Effects of Early-Life Stress, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1559, 1559 (2009); Michael J.
Meaney & Moshe Szyf, Environmental Programming of Stress Responses Through DNA
Methylation: Life at the Interface Between a Dynamic Environment and a Fixed Genome, 7
DIALOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 103, 103 (2005); Patrick O. McGowan et al., Broad
Epigenetic Signature of Maternal Care in the Brain of Adult Rats, 6 PLOS ONE, Feb. 2011, at
1, 6; Dong Liu et al., Maternal Care, Hippocampal Glucocorticoid Receptors, and Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Responses to Stress, 277 SCI. 1659, 1660 (1997); Tim F.
Oberlander et al., Prenatal Exposure to Maternal Depression, Neonatal Methylation of Human
Glucocorticoid Receptor Gene (NR3C1) and Infant Cortisol Stress Responses, 3 EPIGENETICS
97, 97 (2008); James P. Curley et al., Social Enrichment During Postnatal Development
Induces Transgenerational Effects on Emotional and Reproductive Behavior in Mice, 3
FRONTIERS BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1 (2009); Frances A. Champagne, Maternal Imprints and
the Origins of Variation, 60 HORMONES & BEHAV. 4, 4 (2011); Frances A. Champagne & James
P. Curley, Epigenetic Mechanisms Mediating the Long-Term Effects of Maternal Care on
Development, 33 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 593, 593 (2009); Frances A.
Champagne et al., Maternal Care Associated with Methylation of the Estrogen Receptor-ǂ1b
Promoter and Estrogen Receptor-ǂ Expression in the Medial Preoptic Area of Female Offspring,
147 ENDOCRINOLOGY 2909, 2909 (2006); Frances A. Champagne & James P. Curley, How
Social Experiences Influence the Brain, 15 CURRENT OP. NEUROBIOLOGY 704, 704 (2005); see
also DAVID S. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING GENOME: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL EPIGENETICS 60 (2015) (explaining that epigenetic changes caused by environmental factors can
have permanent impacts on a genome).
179. See Karen Hughes et al., The Effect of Multiple Adverse Childhood Experiences on
Health: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 2 LANCET PUB. HEALTH e356, e356 (2017);
Karen A. Kalmakis & Genevieve E. Chandler, Health Consequences of Adverse Childhood
Experiences: A Systematic Review, 27 J. AM. ASS’N NURSE PRACS. 457 (2015).
180. See RICHARD E. NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 47-48 (1996).
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American males to elevate testosterone and cortisol levels in response to a perceived affront, and he is more likely to advocate a
violent response in such circumstances.181 Pulling the trigger would
be more likely if he had been raised with a cultural legacy of his ingroup being historically victimized coupled with an ethos of
revenge.182
Thus, the construction of the protagonist’s brain would have been
sculpted by the collectivity of early life experience, including the
parenting style of those who raised him, his peer influences, and the
cultural values that surrounded him.183 But environment does not
begin at birth, and that adult moment of intent will have been
shaped by the protagonist’s fetal life as well.184 If he had been exposed to high levels of alcohol as a fetus, thanks to elevated blood
alcohol levels in his mother, his frontocortical maturation would
have been impaired.185 If it was high levels of stress hormones,
derived from the mother’s circulation and the adversity that she
experienced, lifelong epigenetic changes would have resulted in a
larger, more reactive amygdala at that moment of reaching for the
gun.186 And higher levels of exposure to testosterone and related
181. See id.
182. For examples of how a victimized in-group combined with an ethos of revenge
increases the likelihood of violence, see WALTER R. BORNEMAN, POLK: THE MAN WHO
TRANSFORMED THE PRESIDENCY AND AMERICA (2008); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN
HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1982).
183. See Diana Baumrind, Child Care Practices Anteceding Three Patterns of Preschool
Behavior, 75 GENETIC PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS 43, 45, 83 (1967) (parenting style); JUDITH RICH
HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN TURN OUT THE WAY THEY DO 33-34 (1998)
(peer influences).
184. See Carmen Rasmussen, Executive Functioning and Working Memory in Fetal Alcohol
Spectrum Disorder, 29 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RSCH. 1359, 1362 (2005).
185. Id.
186. See J. Amiel Rosenkranz et al., Chronic Stress Causes Amygdala Hyperexcitability in
Rodents, 67 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1128 (2010); Sevil Duvarci & Denis Paré, Glucocorticoids
Enhance the Excitability of Principal Basolateral Amygdala Neurons, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE
4482, 4489 (2007); Alexandra Kavushansky & Gal Richter-Levin, Effects of Stress and
Corticosterone on Activity and Plasticity in the Amygdala, 84 J. NEUROSCIENCE RSCH. 1580,
1580 (2006); Alexandra Kavushansky et al., Activity and Plasticity in the CA1, the Dentate
Gyrus, and the Amygdala Following Controllable vs. Uncontrollable Water Stress, 16
HIPPOCAMPUS 35, 35, 40 (2006); Pablo A. Rodriguez Manzanares et al., Previous Stress
Facilitates Fear Memory, Attenuates GABAergic Inhibition, and Increases Synaptic Plasticity
in the Rat Basolateral Amygdala, 25 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8725, 8731-32 (2005); Harini Lakshminarasimhan & Sumantra Chattarji, Stress Leads to Contrasting Effects on the Levels of
Brain Derived Neurotrophic Factor in the Hippocampus and Amygdala, 7 PLOS ONE, Jan.
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androgens during fetal life would have increased the likelihood of
reactive aggression in adulthood.187
If the protagonist had no control over which parents raised him
or which womb he was in when construction of his brain commenced, he certainly had no control over the genes he inherited. As
a caveat that always bears repeating because of well-entrenched
folk beliefs, very little about the effects of genes on the brain and behavior are deterministic and inevitable.188 Instead, genes are about
vulnerabilities and potentials, interacting with different environments in different ways.189 For example, if the protagonist’s genetic
legacy included variants of a gene related to the neurotransmitter
serotonin, it would have increased the likelihood of antisocial
violence, but only if he had been abused as a child.190 As another
example, if he had inherited a gene variant related to oxytocin, it
would have increased his likelihood of reactive aggression, but only
when coupled with alcohol consumption.191
And remarkably, the building blocks of the protagonist “intentionally” pulling the trigger also come from events years, even centuries
before his birth.192 If the protagonist’s ancestors were pastoralists
2012, at 1, 1-2; Supriya Ghosh et al., Functional Connectivity from the Amygdala to the
Hippocampus Grows Stronger After Stress, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7234, 7234, 7243 (2013).
187. See C.W. Joyce et al., Second to Fourth Digit Ratio Confirms Aggressive Tendencies
in Patients with Boxers Fractures, 44 INJURY 1636, 1636-37 (2013); Marina Butovskaya et al.,
Digit Ratio (2D:4D), Aggression, and Dominance in the Hazda and the Datoga of Tanzania,
27 AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 620, 620-21, 624 (2015); Johannes Hönekopp & Steven Watson, MetaAnalysis of the Relationship Between Digit-Ratio 2D:4D and Aggression, 51 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 381, 381 (2011).
188. See Avshalom Caspi et al., Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation by a
Polymorphism in the 5-HTT Gene, 301 SCI. 386, 386, 389 (2003).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Brad J. Bushman, Human Aggression While Under the Influence of Alcohol and
Other Drugs: An Integrative Research Review, 2 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 148, 150-52
(1993); Lening Zhang et al., The Nexus Between Alcohol and Violent Crime, 21 ALCOHOLISM:
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RSCH. 1264, 1265 (1997); Kathryn Graham & Paulette West,
Alcohol and Crime: Examining the Link, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE AND PROBLEMS 439, 453 (Nick Heather et al. eds., 2001); S. Chiavegatto et al.,
Individual Vulnerability to Escalated Aggressive Behavior by a Low Dose of Alcohol: Decreased
Serotonin Receptor mRNA in the Prefrontal Cortex of Male Mice, 9 GENES, BRAIN & BEHAV.
110, 110 (2010); A. Johansson et al., Alcohol and Aggressive Behavior in Men—Moderating
Effects of Oxytocin Receptor Gene (OXTR) Polymorphisms, 11 GENES, BRAIN & BEHAV. 214,
214, 219 (2012).
192. See Damian R. Murray & Mark Schaller, Historical Prevalence of Infectious Diseases
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(as opposed to farmers or hunter-gatherers), he would have been
more likely to have been raised in a culture of honor.193 If his ancestors lived in desert, rather than rain forest, he would have been
more likely to have been raised in a culture that is monotheistic,
hierarchical, with warrior-classes and a belief that if you die in
battle, you are assured a paradisiacal afterlife.194 If his ancestors
half a millennium ago lived in an environment with a particularly
heavy infectious disease load, he would have been more likely to
have been raised in a xenophobic culture.195
And finally, pushing causal roots back tens of millions of years,
humans could have evolved to be one of the relatively rare primate
species that always form stable pair-bonds featuring extensive
amounts of male parental behavior (for example, numerous South
American monkeys).196 Humans did not, and that fact not only
makes it more likely that the protagonist would have fired the gun,
but that our species would have invented guns in the first place.197
Virtually all the behavioral biological findings reviewed in this
Part were discovered only in recent decades, with the majority only
in recent years. What they show is that who we are in the present
is nothing more or less than the randomness of our biology and its
interactions with our environment.198 “Intent” as used in the sense
to imply agency or responsibility is meaningless. Our intentions,
along with our desires, values, aversions, proclivities, vulnerabilities, tastes, quirks, and so on, are the end products of factors over
which we had no control in the past and of which we have little

Within 230 Geopolitical Regions: A Tool for Investigating Origins of Culture, 41 J. CROSSCULTURAL PSYCH. 99, 100 (2010).
193. See Carol R. Ember & Melvin Ember, Warfare, Aggression, and Resource Problems:
Cross-Cultural Codes, 26 BEHAV. SCI. RSCH. 169 (1992); Hervey C. Peoples & Frank W.
Marlowe, Subsistence and the Evolution of Religion, 23 HUM. NATURE 253, 253, 255, 263
(2012).
194. See Ember & Ember, supra note 193; Peoples & Marlowe, supra note 193, at 264.
195. See Murray & Schaller, supra note 192, at 100.
196. See Jason C. Buchan et al., True Paternal Care in a Multi-Male Primate Society, 425
NATURE 179, 179 (2003).
197. For explanations of how the human species has evolved somewhere between a pairbonding and tournament species, see generally DAVID P. BARASH & JUDITH EVE LIPTON, THE
MYTH OF MONOGAMY: FIDELITY AND INFIDELITY IN ANIMALS AND PEOPLE (2001); BERNARD
CHAPAIS, PRIMEVAL KINSHIP: HOW PAIR-BONDING GAVE BIRTH TO HUMAN SOCIETY (2008).
198. See Caspi et al., supra note 188.
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awareness in the present.199 One classic finding could serve as the
poster child for this worldview (even if it concerns issues far afield
from the pulling of a trigger): Ask subjects their favorite detergent.
If they have just read a paragraph containing the word “ocean,” they
are more likely to choose Tide—and to then confidently explain the
reasoning and intentionality behind their choice.200
CONCLUSION
Here’s the problem: We have developed an understanding of
human agency that conflicts with popular conceptions and prevailing societal (including legal) norms. And there is not merely discontinuity between the two models, the popular (law’s) and the
veridical (ours); there is conflict. If we are right (and we are sure we
are) the law is wrong—persistently and consistently wrong in ways
that actually undermine human welfare (and threaten human
thriving). Moreover, the problem is fundamental; the fiction on
which the popular model (and extant legal doctrine) is primarily
based is a fiction to which human agents are predisposed, for reasons that must have made more sense on the savanna about 250,000
years ago. Indeed, it is a fiction to which the authors of this Article
are predisposed. We recognize the difficulty of peeking behind the
curtain that hides what we are in fact: a mechanical marvel,
marvelous certainly, but most importantly, mechanical.201
What the popular model relies upon is the stuff of noninstrumental philosophy, a divine or secular natural law that imagines
there is more to heaven and earth than is dreamt of in our philosophy.202 Morality—the morality that would govern nonmechanical
actors—depends on the inscrutable and affords what we sense
(albeit, through a glass, darkly) as more fundamental than what we
can see (and have reason to believe we will see better as the promise
of neuroscience is fulfilled).203 The mechanical human agent
revealed by neuroscientific insights rejects the conclusion that there
199. See Kari Edwards, The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and
Change, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 202, 212 (1990).
200. See id.
201. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part II.
203. See supra Part II.
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is something inscrutable, though it accepts that we do not understand everything yet that we will, in time, come to understand.204
Perhaps nothing demonstrates the conflict between the popular
model and the mechanical model better than determinism’s rejection of libertarian free will as well as its adjunct compatibilism.205
If we are nothing but the coordination of mechanical processes, then
there is no such thing as free will, not even the little bit of free will
that less absolutist compatibilists might settle for. And if there is no
such thing as free will, then there is no such thing as moral
responsibility, blame, desert, praise, or any other measure of human
virtue. We do not see that as problematic: when our car becomes so
in need of repair that it is dangerous, we consult a mechanic, not a
moral philosopher. So when the law decides how to respond to
behavior that undermines human thriving, it would be enough for
the law to look forward, to consider only instrumental objects.
Nothing would be gained by looking backward and punishing the
criminal any more than we would punish the car for its engine
problems. We might invest resources fixing the car (modifying the
behavior of the criminal), but we would not shame it.
While we are not sanguine, we are hopeful. We do not imagine
that the law will change very dramatically any time soon. We do not
imagine that human agents’ affection for the moral responsibility
system (with the self-satisfying glow it can impart, for some) is going anywhere for the foreseeable future. The law will seem to be
stuck, and there is little doubt that challenges such as those this
Article throws at the law would avoid politicization. But there may
be signs of hope.
Every time a judge takes into account the nascent moral agency
of a juvenile, the law recognizes the mechanistic conception of human agency implicit in the fact that the brain matures gradually
over time.206 Every time the law rejects purely formal indicia of
consent that undermine true agreement, the “meeting of the minds”
upon which welfare creation depends, and insists upon genuine understanding, the law vindicates a conception of human agency that
204. See supra Part III.
205. See Luis E. Chiesa, Selective Incompatibilism, Free Will, and the (Limited) Role of
Retribution in Punishment Theory, 71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 977, 981-87 (2019).
206. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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will accommodate human thriving.207 And every time the law moves
toward an allocation of loss based on the way the brain actually
works rather than on the way a moral responsibility system may
conceive of its working, the law moves closer to understanding what
it means to be human.208
Perhaps there is no more hopeful sign than the law’s understanding the disease that is addiction. For most of law’s history, there has
been a tension between the moral and disease models of addiction.
The dominant model has understood addiction to be a moral failing:
the product of improvident choice.209 Those addicted to substances
that would ultimately harm them (and even destroy the lives of
those around them) are understood to have made bad choices, which
they were, of course, free not to have made; the fallacy of volition is
shown when it becomes clear that coercive cravings strong enough
to produce addiction are the product of the likes of dopamine receptor abnormalities in brain regions related to anticipation.210
Historically, so many have claimed further proof for moral interpretations of addiction from the circumstances common to many
addicted persons: they are irresponsible, perhaps lesser- or uneducated, they do not share our values; indeed, they do not even
look like us!
Well, then the opioid nightmare emerged.211 The high school
cheerleader, who lives right next door and whose parents drive such
nice cars, sprained her ankle badly and became addicted to painkillers, and then, when she could not get the painkillers by prescription anymore she found a way to buy them from “those people”
in those other neighborhoods, the ones we always avoided. When
that was not enough, she turned to those harder drugs, the ones we
only heard about famous musicians taking. And what was a problem
for some other community, what was proof-positive of the moral
207. See supra Part I.A.
208. See, e.g., supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (“No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person
of good moral character who ... is, or was ... a habitual drunkard.”).
210. See Christian A. Heidbreder et al., The Role of Central Dopamine D3 Receptors in
Drug Addiction: A Review of Pharmacological Evidence, 49 BRAIN RSCH. REVS. 77, 94-96
(2005).
211. See generally Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://perma.cc/W42MTVFV].
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deficiency of those people, became a problem for us. So we decided
that the problem was a disease, maybe not a moral failing after all.
That is not a bad thing; indeed, it is a very good thing.
Recently, an innovative therapy for those suffering from profound
substance addiction came to the notice of the popular press.212 Socalled “deep brain stimulation” has been used for some time to treat
a range of neural conditions including Parkinson’s disease, epilepsy,
and obsessive-compulsive disorder.213 In fact, by 2020 about 200,000
people around the world had such implants.214 Insofar as addiction
is a brain disease, there might be reason to believe that neural
implants could respond to the cravings that support addiction.215 If
impulses from a collateral device, inserted subcutaneously near the
collar bone, “fire” to counteract the impulses, then the cycle of addiction might be interrupted.216 The therapy is, of course, experimental and designed only as a last or near-last resort for those
whose addictions have become life threatening.217 But given the fact
that substance addiction is the leading cause of death for those
under the age of fifty,218 and given the great—perhaps even
incalculable—societal costs of addiction, there may be good reason
to explore this response.219 Just imagine a world with just half the
rate of substance abuse to which society is now subject. What
impact would that reduction have on our criminal justice system? If
we were to empty our jails and prisons of just half the people who
are there because of drug crimes or crimes perpetrated while under
the influence of drugs, the criminal justice and correctional resources saved would be dramatic. And, we could imagine those
saved resources could be diverted to more constructive purposes,

212. See Lenny Bernstein, Addiction Treatment Had Failed. Could Brain Surgery Save
Him?, WASH. POST (June 18, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/
06/18/deep-brain-stimulation-addiction/ [https://perma.cc/8H2H-2LHP].
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Dean Reynolds, Overdoses Now Leading Cause of Death of Americans Under 50,
CBS NEWS (June 6, 2017, 8:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/overdoses-are-leadingcause-of-death-americans-under-50/ [https://perma.cc/WY99-RJBC].
219. See, e.g., Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 211.
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rather than the removal from society of those subject to impulses
they cannot control.
So we need not indulge science fiction in order to see how neuroscientific insights might impact the law within the next decade.
While the use of neural implants to control addiction is not likely to
become the norm anytime soon,220 the fact that we are approaching
brain implant therapies to adjust behaviors that law has, for some
time, considered a matter of “choice,” is crucial. It is one thing to use
brain implants to respond to disease, such as Parkinson’s or
epilepsy. No one, not even the most libertarian believer in free will,
would suggest that the victim of those neural conditions chose them.
But much of our law of addiction, to this day, is based on the “moral
choice” rather than “disease” model of addiction.221 That is clearly
“Erewhonian.”222 And it is significant that neural implants, direct
physical intervention into brain operation, may be used to respond
to addiction, because addiction is a compelling topic for those who
write and think about the relationship between law and neuroscience. It is clear that the criminal law’s prosecution of those addicted
to controlled substances on account of their possession and use of
those substances gets dangerously close to criminalizing status,
which would violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (as well as undermine the sanctity of self).223
Perhaps most provocatively, the Washington Post reported that
“[t]he device, known as a deep brain stimulator, also is recording the
electrical activity in [the patient’s] brain—another innovation that
researchers hope will help locate a biomarker for addiction and
allow earlier intervention with other people.”224 We can, then, imagine not just therapies that reduce suffering and enhance human
thriving after the fact but potential prophylactic measures that
could anticipate destructive behaviors (criminal behaviors generally?) and prevent thoughts and actions that avoid suffering ab
initio. That would certainly change what we understand it means to
be human, and may go too far?

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Bernstein, supra note 212.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
See Bernstein, supra note 212.
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We end where we began: The title of this Article makes clear that
there is no moral failing; there is only disease, if by “disease” we
mean a malfunctioning mechanism. And, what’s more, the disease
is no one’s “fault”; it has been hard-wired from the time our ancestors first ventured onto solid land—if not well before.225 Legal
conclusions and consequences based on fault, then, fail. They undermine rather than serve human thriving. We imagine that that
conclusion will not seem so extreme in ten years or so, and we believe that the science has already provided us much of what we need
(though not all) to have confidence that the arc of neuroscience’s
reconceptualization of human agency in terms that will change what
we understand it means to be human will bend toward a more
humane legal system, one that is consonant with human thriving.

225. See supra Part III.

